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all twentieth-century political theory has basically posed the same question: 
what is the relationship between the State, power and social classes? … If 
all political theory and all theories of socialism (including Marxism) revolve 
around this question, this is because it constitutes a real problem. … It also 
involves the question of the transformation of the State in the transition to 
democratic socialism (State, Power, Socialism, pp. 11, 14) 
 
It is a great honour and gives me enormous personal pleasure to deliver the first 
Annual Nicos Poulantzas Memorial Lecture in Athens tonight. Although I met Nicos 
Poulantzas only once, towards the end of his life, his impact on my intellectual 
development has been immense and is matched only by that of Karl Marx and 
Antonio Gramsci. His influence is reflected in terms of what I have taken from him 
and, I hope, taken further as well as in terms of where I have disagreed with him 
and even moved further away from his positions. Thus delivering this lecture is an 
opportunity to repay some of that intellectual debt and, more importantly, to illustrate 
that a theorist continues to live as long as his or her work continues to be debated. I 
am therefore happy to note that there is an exciting and productive Poulantzas 
revival as issues that he identified in the 1970s are once more on the theoretical and 
political agenda.  
 
This revival is reflected in two of the three themes of my lecture title – political 
economy and democratic socialism. The third theme – linking the other two – is 
political ecology. For I want to argue this evening that, without a proper engagement 
with political ecology, we cannot consolidate Poulantzas’s lessons about political 
economy and the democratic transition to democratic socialism. My lecture has four 
main sections: (a) some general reflections on the originality, legacy and actuality  
of Poulantzas’s work; (b) a re-appropriation of his critique of political economy; (c) a 
discussion of his neglect of the environment and issues of political ecology; and 
(d) a reassertion of the continued validity of his arguments about the democratic 
transition to democratic socialism. 
 1. Why Poulantzas Still Matters 
 
Over 20 years ago, in my intellectual biography of Poulantzas, I described him as 
the most important Marxist political theorist of the postwar period (Jessop 1985). 
Tonight I want both to reaffirm and qualify this view by arguing that his studies are 
not so much "contemporary" as "classical" in their current standing. This useful 
distinction derives from Niklas Luhmann, who suggests that a theory can be seen as 
"classical" when it offers an interconnected set of claims that has been superseded 
by later theoretical developments and is, therefore, no longer convincing in its 
original form. Yet it survives as a challenge, desideratum, or problem on a 
theoretical level as long as its way of posing problems can still be accepted. Thus its 
authoritative character is ambivalent: one can infer from such a theory what must be 
achieved, but no longer how to achieve it (Luhmann 1982: 4).  
 
This is a fair description of the status of Poulantzas’s work in the 21st century and 
would certainly not have surprised this great thinker. For, as he noted in State, 
Power, Socialism, ‘[t]he theory of the capitalist State cannot be isolated from the 
history of its constitution and reproduction’ (1978a: 25, italics in original). Thus as 
capitalism continues to change, the theory of the capitalist state must be revised to 
reflect those changes. Yet the revolutionary approach to the capitalist state that he 
developed in his later work still provides the best starting point for these revisions. I 
have already attempted this in relation to the updating of Poulantzas’s seminal 
analysis of ‘Internationalization of Capitalist Relations and the Nation-State’ (1974, 
1975) in my paper on ‘Globalization and the National State’ (2002). I want to initiate 
the same task tonight for Poulantzas’s more general arguments, unfortunately 
neglected compared with his state theory, on the critique of political economy. But 
first let me review the originality, legacy and actuality of his work more broadly. 
 
Poulantzas's intellectual career began with studies in Marxist legal philosophy and 
legal theory that were inspired by Sartrean existentialism; he then turned to political 
theory and began to develop a view of the capitalist type of state and political 
struggle that owed much to Gramsci. This approach was soon integrated into a 
broader perspective on the state in capitalist societies influenced (not always to the 
good) by the structural Marxism of Louis Althusser and Étienne Balibar. Soon 
afterwards, he began a slow retreat from the immobilizing implications of this kind of 
structuralism and showed increasing concern with strategically relevant theoretical 
issues -- such as the nature of fascism and military dictatorships, the changing 
contours of imperialism and social class relations, and the role of parties and social 
movements in modern capitalism. In his final studies he increasingly addressed 
problems posed by the self-evident crisis in Marxism as social theory and as a guide 
to practice -- taking on board some of the arguments about power advanced by 
Foucault and tackling some key issues concerning s socialism and the democratic 
transition to democratic socialism. Notwithstanding these many and varied 
concerns, his major theoretical contribution was to develop a view of state power as 
a social relation that is reproduced in and through the interplay between the state's 
institutional form and the changing balance of political forces.  
 
Poulantzas's significance resides in the fact that he was almost alone among 
postwar Marxists to address and answer the really crucial questions within Marxist 
politics. These questions can be inferred from a critique of Western Marxism by 
Perry Anderson, one of its leading Anglophone exponents. Anderson argues that 
Western Marxism failed to answer the following key questions:  
 
What is the real nature and structure of bourgeois democracy as a type of 
State system, that has become the normal mode of capitalist power in the 
advanced countries? What type of revolutionary strategy is capable of 
overthrowing this historical form of State - so distinct from that of Tsarist 
Russia? What would be the institutional forms of socialist democracy in the 
West, beyond it? Marxist theory has scarcely touched these three subjects in 
their interconnection (Anderson 1976: 103). 
 
Yet these three subjects preoccupied Poulantzas from 1964 until his death in 1979. 
His first influential book, Political Power and Social Classes (1968), explored the 
real nature and structure of bourgeois democracy. Fascism and Dictatorship (1970) 
dealt with the nature of fascist regimes and the failure of organized labour either to 
check their rise or to overthrow them. It was also directly concerned with the 
distinction between the 'normal mode of capitalist power in the advanced countries' 
and various 'exceptional' modes of bourgeois political domination. In his third and 
fourth books, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism (1974) and Crisis of the 
Dictatorships (1976), Poulantzas related problems of revolutionary strategy to 
democratic and exceptional regimes in both advanced and dependent capitalist 
countries. And his final book, State, Power, Socialism (1978a) reviewed 
contemporary threats to bourgeois democracy and the institutional forms that 
socialist democracy might assume in the West. Moreover, not only did Poulantzas 
tackle each of these topics, he also explored them in 'their interconnection'. 
 
Poulantzas also addressed other important issues in Marxist theory. Anderson is 
also a useful guide here, mentioning four other failures. Contemporary Marxism had 
not tackled the meaning and position of the nation as a social unit and its 
relationship to nationalism. It had ignored the contemporary laws of motion of 
capitalism as a mode of production and the forms of crisis specific to these laws. It 
had neglected the true configuration of imperialism as an international system of 
economic and political domination. And it had not explored the nature of the 
bureaucratic states that developed in those backward countries where socialist 
revolutions had occurred. Poulantzas confronted all of these issues too. He was 
particularly concerned with contemporary imperialism as well as with the political 
economy of modern capitalism. He also touched on the nation and nationalism, 
especially in State, Power, Socialism, and on the problems of bureaucratic socialism 
and Stalinism. Thus he was an unusual Western Marxist.  
 
But what drove Poulantzas towards his eventual leftwing Eurocommunist position? 
The key appears to be his involvement in Greek and French politics. For Greece, his 
principal concern was to understand its military dictatorship, the conditions leading 
to the latter's overthrow, the prospects for moving from an anti-dictatorial alliance to 
an anti-imperialist, anti-monopoly alliance, and the absence of working class 
hegemony in the democratization process. The two key turning points for him were 
the Greek coup in April 1967 – which put the significance of the distinction between 
democracy and dictatorship on the agenda at exactly the same time as he was 
writing on the bourgeois democratic state as the most adequate form of capitalist 
state for securing bourgeois hegemony – and its eventual collapse, against most 
leftwing expectations, under the weight of its own internal contradictions in May 
1974. The way in which the dictatorship collapsed, especially the absence of mass 
struggles directly concerned to confront the state, confirmed Poulantzas in his 
rapidly growing suspicion that the state was far from monolithic and that class 
struggle penetrated deep within the state itself. In turn this implied that a left 
Eurocommunist strategy aimed at intensifying the contradictions internal to the 
state as well as mobilizing the popular masses outside the state could prepare the 
ground for the eventual democratic transformation of the state system as a whole 
and its mobilization in support of even broader democratic socialist changes.  
 
A further important influence was the break-up of the Union de la Gauche at the 
instigation of the French Communist Party in 1977, the subsequent decline in 
cooperation between socialists and communists in various spheres at different 
scales, and deterioration in the overall position of the left parties in France in 1978-
1979 (and, indeed, beyond).1 This prompted Poulantzas to lose faith in the leading 
role of vanguard communist parties and in proletarian struggles as the primary 
motor force in revolutionary transformation; and to turn towards a more complex -- 
but also more problematic -- alliance strategy. This should not only be pluri- 
classiste but also pluripartiste and, as such, it denied any a priori privilege to the 
working class or communist party. It emphasized the autonomous role of non-class 
forces and social movements in the struggle for democratic socialism. Indeed 
Poulantzas began to value the contributions of popular-democratic struggles and 
of cross-class 'new social movements' to a democratic transition to democratic 
socialism. This view was reinforced by the turbulence and eventual failure of the 
Carnation Revolution in Portugal (April 1974 to November 1975 and beyond) 
despite the more favourable position held by left-wing forces in the initial struggle 
for power. In this regard Poulantzas was particularly scathing about the Portuguese 
reformists' focus on infiltrating the leading personnel of the state at the expense of 
mass struggle as well as about the ultra-left's misguided beliefs that socialism had 
arrived and that the state would therefore simply wither away and so could be safely 
ignored. He called instead for a strategy that would democratize the state so that it 
could be used to defend autonomous rank-and-file movements at a distance from 
the state. Such a strategy, which was developed in discussions, interviews, and 
journalism, in a long essay on the crisis of the state (1976), and in his last two 
books, would also, he claimed, help the left to avoid the sort of statist degeneration 
of socialism that had occurred in the Soviet bloc. 
 2. Poulantzas’s Contributions to the Critique of Political Economy 
 
Poulantzas's early work showed little interest in the nature and dynamics of capital 
accumulation. In Political Power and Social Classes (1973), he justified this neglect 
in terms of the distinctive separation in the capitalist mode of production between (a) 
the profit-oriented, market-mediated logic of capital accumulation and (b) the 
bourgeois-democratic, politically-mediated logic of national-popular hegemony that 
characterized a relatively autonomous sphere of political struggle. In this context he 
further argued that capital accumulation followed its own logic of economic 
exploitation, valorization, and realization under the dominance of market forces 
without the need for any direct, extra-economic intervention through coercion or 
other means into the labour process. This absence also enabled the state to be 
analysed as another relatively autonomous region within the overall matrix of the 
capitalist mode of production. Moreover, in order to get as quickly as possible to the 
autonomous science of the political, Poulantzas confessed that ‘certain key 
concepts of historical materialism do not get covered adequately because the focus 
is on the necessary order of exposition of a text bearing on the regional theory of the 
political’ (1973: 24). 
 
Step by step, however, culminating in State, Power, Socialism, Poulantzas moved 
from this exaggerated account of the mutual relative autonomies of the market 
economy and the constitutional state to a highly innovative account of capitalist 
relations of production and the state's role in their constitution and expanded 
reproduction. He came to argue that the social relations of capitalist production were 
inherently economic, political, and ideological in nature (1978a, 1978b). This was 
not due to the structural interpenetration in capitalist social formations of three 
‘relatively autonomous’ economic, political, and ideological regions – the position 
that Poulantzas maintained in Political Power and Social Classes and that seems to 
have survived in one form or another until 1977-1978. The presence of these 
structuralist residues in Poulantzas reflected an ambiguity in the meanings of 
economics, politics, and ideology – as aspects of diverse social relations and as 
structured ensembles of institutionally embedded practices respectively (cf. Théret 
1992). Moving away from this position, Poulantzas now grounded his argument in 
the fact that the 'social relations of production, exploitation, and extraction of 
surplus-value' had their own distinctive political and ideological moments as well as 
an economic moment. While the last-mentioned moment was constituted through 
the differential distribution of the economic class powers of ownership and 
possession, Poulantzas also identified a political moment that is grounded in 
relations of authority within the labour process (e.g., factory despotism, 
bureaucratization) and an ideological moment grounded in the division between 
manual and mental labour within the labour process and its implications for 
subjectivation (assujettissement) and lived experience in the economic region.  
 
This approach is far removed from the usual Marxist hierarchical model of an 
economic base, a corresponding juridico-political order that provides legal 
guarantees and political support to the profit-oriented, market-mediated economy, 
and an even more remote ideological superstructure and forms of consciousness, 
both of which nonetheless react back on the economic base. For, in contrast to this 
traditional topographic model with its economistic treatment of the economy, 
Poulantzas's new approach reveals ‘capitalist relations of production in all their 
complexity’ (1978b: 115-116, italics in original). Along with his more advanced 
analysis of the social division of labour and his growing interest in the differential 
articulation of different types of economic space (e.g., 1978b: 117; and, especially, 
1978a), this provides one possible means towards a partial reconciliation with 
Foucault, a theorist whose substantive analyses of power he appreciated even as 
he rejected many of their meta-theoretical assumptions. Indeed, as Marsden notes 
in an interesting comparison of Marx and Foucault, whereas Marx tells us why, but 
cannot tell us how, Foucault tells us how, but cannot tell us why (Marsden 1999). 
 
This new approach permits a very different view of class powers with great, if 
unrealized, potential to resolve at least several major problems in class analysis.  
 
1. It indicates that economic, political, and ideological class powers are all 
present inside the social relations of production, exploitation, and surplus-
value extraction rather than being distributed separately across three 
corresponding levels or regions of a social formation. This overcomes the 
problem that Poulantzas faced in Political Power and Social Classes of trying 
to define social classes in terms of their simultaneous location within distinct 
but interrelated (hence 'relatively autonomous') economic, political, and 
ideological regions. Social classes can now be defined in terms of complex 
class powers exercised within the labour process and the circuit of capital 
and their articulation with other forms of production.  
 
2. This enables a careful analysis in turn of how these complex class powers 
are supported through biases or asymmetries inscribed in the institutional 
materiality of the juridico-political and/or ideological spheres and through the 
differential effects of extra-economic powers that are exercised in these other 
domains. While the exercise of such extra-economic powers has a definite 
class relevance by virtue of their differential impact on the expanded 
reproduction of the social relations of production, exploitation, and surplus-
value extraction, these powers are typically marked, as Poulantzas noted for 
the normal capitalist type of state, by the constitutive absence of class from 
their formal institutional matrix. This disjunction creates distinctive fields and 
forms of political and ideological class struggle to secure the conditions for 
political and ideological as well as economic class domination. Each of these 
fields and forms of struggle has its own logics reflecting the form-determined 
institutional materialities of their respective spheres and their interrelations 
with each other and the social relations of production (cf. Marx, Capital 
Volume III, page to follow). Gramsci's analyses are especially resonant here 
because they address the problem of struggles for hegemony, the formation 
of power blocs, the mobilization of supporting classes, the relevance of social 
categories such as bureaucrats and intellectuals, and so forth.  
 
3. Another crucial field of inquiry that opens up here is the forms in which social 
classes are present, if at all, in the fields of political and ideological struggle 
as well as the effects of their absence. Poulantzas argued from the mid-
1960s onwards that social classes were not directly represented as such in 
the political and ideological spheres and that an enormous effort was 
required to organize the changing balance of social forces to secure class 
interests in changing conjunctures. For example, as he noted in Political 
Power and Social Classes, the exercise of the techno-economic, narrowly 
juridico-political, and ideological functions of the capitalist type of state were 
typically constrained by the overall political imperative of maintaining social 
cohesion in a class-divided society. This in turn is reflected in the need for the 
various fractions of the power bloc to make short-term economic sacrifices in 
order to secure long-term political class domination. There are many 
examples of Poulantzas's recognition of these complexities in the field of 
political and ideological class struggle -- both in his general theoretical 
studies, which drew on careful reading of the Marxist classics, and in his 
historical studies of fascism, military dictatorships, and authoritarian statism. 
What this highlights is the importance of developing appropriate strategic as 
well as structural concepts for the analysis of class powers, class domination, 
and class hegemony and, a fortiori, for the disjunctions, uneven development, 
and contradictions within and across different fields of struggle. This is why 
he described some of his work as concerned with applied strategic concepts 
rather than with the more abstract-formal analysis of the economic and 
political regions (reference to follow).  
 
4. By the same token, this new approach also provides the means to avoid 
class reductionist analyses of the political and ideological regions. For it is no 
longer necessary to argue either for the immediate structural determination of 
class relations by the repressive and/ideological state apparatuses or for an 
unmediated presence/absence of economic classes inside these 
apparatuses. In the latter respect, it is enough to calculate the class-
relevance of the overall structure of the political region, the balance of forces 
inside the state, and the balance of forces at a distance from the state and its 
implications for the exercise of state power. This is perfectly coherent with 
Poulantzas’s innovative claim that the state is a social relation or, less 
elliptically, that state power is a form-determined material condensation of the 
balance of (class) forces in struggle. Thus, rather than looking for immediate 
correlations across different fields of social organization, this approach opens 
the space for analysis of disjunctions and uneven development as well as for 
the presence and actions of specific social categories (such as bureaucrats 
or intellectuals) located in this domains. 
 
5. Another set of issues that can be explored in these terms are the limits to 
state intervention that is intended to challenge the capitalist character of the 
social relations of production, whatever the prevailing balance of political 
forces. For these limits are rooted in (a) the separation of market economy 
and the state apparatus and, especially, (b) in the exclusion of the state, as 
Poulantzas recognized, from the heart of the organization of production. 
 
It follows that this approach is far more consistent with Poulantzas’s emphasis on 
(a) the state’s variable presence in the constitution and expanded reproduction of 
the relations of production and (b) of its incarnation par excellence of the manual-
mental division of labour. It is also far more consistent with his distinctive analysis of 
the state’s role, partly mediated by struggles for hegemony conducted in and 
through the capitalist type of state, in organizing the dominant classes into a power 
bloc as well as disorganizing the subordinate classes [needs expanding]. 
 
Before moving to the question of political ecology, I will briefly identify some 
limitations to Poulantzas's analysis of class powers and the dynamic of 
contemporary capitalism. These include: (a) the weakness of his analysis of 
economic crisis-tendencies, which owes too much to the over-simplified laws of 
overaccumulation-devalorization derived from the work of Paul Boccara and his 
colleagues in the French Communist Party or else to a basic tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall derived from Capital Volume III; (b) the grounding of his analysis of 
contemporary capitalism in the features of Atlantic Fordism during the period of its 
expansion and initial crisis – which allowed Poulantzas to rethink imperialism, the 
comprador and national bourgeoisies, and the significance of the interior 
bourgeoisie, but limited his ability to think beyond Atlantic Fordism and its crises-
tendencies to potentially new stages and/or varieties of capitalism as they had 
begun to emerge within the overall context of a rapidly changing world market; and 
(c) the continuing ‘methodological nationalism’ of Poulantzas’s analysis of the  
state even in the face of his growing recognition of the transnationalization of 
capitalist relations of ownership, possession, exploitation, and realization (for a 
more extended critique, see Jessop 2002). I conclude this section by bending the 
stick back in its rightful direction through noting that Poulantzas's contributions in 
other areas remain sadly under-recognized. These include his innovative work in 
relation to the nation, spatio-temporality, the politics of memory, and the mental-
manual division of labour. 
 
3. Poulantzas on Nature and Political Ecology 
 
It is not the unity of living and active humanity with the natural, inorganic 
conditions of their metabolic exchange with nature, and hence their 
appropriation of nature, which requires explanation or is the result of a 
historic process, but rather the separation between these inorganic 
conditions of human existence and this active existence, a separation which 
is completely posited only in the relation of wage labour and capital’ (Marx, 
Grundrisse) 
 
Poulantzas was an innovative thinker in many respects; in others, as one might 
expect from the uneven development of intellectual life, he was very much part of 
his epoch. He was writing when Fordism was still the dominant metropolitan 
accumulation regime. This regime is one that, if supported by an appropriate mode 
of regulation, involves a virtuous circle of growing mass production and matching 
increases in mass consumption in privileged regions and that was underpinned, 
thanks to imperialism and its control of strategic resources, by a continuing decline 
in real oil prices as its critical input. The Fordist growth model was reflected in 
widespread neglect of the complex, organic relations between humankind and the 
natural environment and in an optimistic belief in the capacity of technological 
progress to resolve environmental problems. In addition, during this period, 
Poulantzas's main theoretical concerns were class relations, the specificity of the 
capitalist state and hegemonic struggles, and the distinction between normal and 
exceptional regimes. His analyses of economic crises were primarily based on the 
assumption of a generic crisis tendency that took the form of the tendency of the 
rate of profit to fall and the importance of mobilizing counter-tendencies thereto. He 
made no references to ecological factors, let alone their fundamental organic link  
in contemporary societies to the logic of capital accumulation.  
 Likewise, his primary political concerns were Greek and French politics, where the 
environment had at best a secondary role on the political scene (on the French 
case, see Whiteside 2002). Thus his references to the environment in this context 
were almost wholly confined to environmental movements, which he treated as 
operating, like the women's and students' movements, on secondary fronts in the 
class struggle (cf. 1978b). It is hardly surprising, then, that he ignored the 
implications of capital’s distinctive metabolic interaction with nature. How times 
change. During the mid-1970s, with the crisis of Fordism and the first and second oil 
shocks, the environmental limits to continuing capital accumulation in advanced 
capitalist economies were becoming self-evident. Today, it is virtually impossible 
(even for the Bush Administration) to ignore how the environment has acquired a 
primary role in economic, political, and ideological struggles as well as the 
importance of achieving an adequate understanding of the organic relations 
between capitalism and nature. 
 
Conjunctural issues apart, while there has recently been a path-breaking recovery 
of the wide-ranging and systematic concern of Marx (and Engels) with the natural 
conditions of wealth production alongside the contributions of labour-power and its 
their implications for the destructive logic of capital accumulation (see especially 
Burkett 1999, Foster 2000), the neglect of political ecology in the critique of political 
economy is a marked feature of the historical materialist tradition for some 120 
years. Among the reasons for this, varying in different periods and/or cases, are: 
 
• Rejection of Malthusian pessimism about the demographic limits to growth; 
• Rejection of social Darwinism with its apparent biological determinism; 
• Belief in capitalism's progressive role in developing the productive forces in 
preparation for a transition to socialism and then communism;  
• A focus on the internal contradictions of capitalism rather than on the external 
limits to continued accumulation;2  
• The focus of Marxist political economy on what separates capitalism from  
pre-capitalist modes of production – the appropriation and transformation of 
nature being, in contrast, a feature of ‘production in general’;  
• A relative neglect of the use-value dimensions of generalized commodity 
production in order to concentrate on the distinctive features of exchange-
value in the capitalist logic of valorization; and 
• Denial of the damage being done in Stalinist industrialization to catch up 
with advanced capitalism [need a source for this].  
 
Thus lack of interest was common among Poulantzas's Marxist contemporaries. In 
addition, Poulantzas himself was fighting a deliberate battle against technological 
determinism – he argued forcefully for the primacy of the social relations of 
production over the forces of production. This encouraged neglect of raw nature as 
a source of wealth and as a force of production. Later, he would admit that, in 
focusing his attack on economism, he had bent the stick in the other direction, i.e., 
towards politicism (1978a: 51-2). But he never recognized that, in so doing, he had 
bent the stick even further away from engaging with ecological issues. Thus he 
nowhere referred to the importance of first nature or its transformation through 
social practices into second nature. Moreover, apart from some occasional remarks 
on the environmental damage done by state socialism in the Soviet bloc because of 
its excessive focus on technological development, the environment is fully absent 
from his theoretical and political horizons. 
 
Does this mean that Poulantzas, who was always sensitive to changing theoretical 
conjunctures - without being a dedicated follower of every theoretical fashion -- 
would have had nothing to say in the face of increasing concern with environmental 
issues and political ecology? And does it mean that, while he was equally sensitive 
to contemporary strategic issues, he would not have integrated political ecological 
concerns into his views of democratic socialism? One could respond that these are 
unanswerable hypothetical questions. But it is still worth reflecting upon what a 
strategic-relational reading of the kind presented in Poulantzas’s final studies might 
contribute to these questions. This does not mean putting words directly into his 
mouth but simply involves rational speculation about the implications of his 
approach for a critical political ecology. In this spirit, then, I make five suggestions: 
 
1. Poulantzas would have rejected both eco- and anthropo-centric accounts 
of the relation between nature and the human species respectively in 
favour of a critical, historicized, relational account of the forms of nature 
and humanity and, of course, their changing articulation. This follows both 
from his historical, relational analysis of the individual (and 
individualization), the nation, space, time, and other social categories and 
from his lasting concern with the overdetermination of such categories by 
class relations (e.g., 1973, 1978a). It also reflects Marx's own insistence 
on the historical specificity of how natural conditions are articulated with 
social relations of production and their subsequent co-evolution (cf. 
Burkett 1999: passim). Moreover, given my earlier remarks on 
Poulantzas's acute recognition of the significance of the separation of the 
economic and the political regions of the capitalist mode of production 
and/or of capitalist social formations, he would probably have been 
equally sensitive to the disjunction introduced between the natural 
conditions of production and the value form of wealth, considered as an 
'immense accumulation of commodities', in which many natural conditions 
are disregarded (and, indeed, seriously harmed, if not destroyed) because 
they have no 'value' from a capitalist viewpoint. On the other hand, he 
would probably not have attempted to explain contemporary ‘first nature’ 
or ‘second nature’ purely in terms of the logic of capital accumulation,3 
having both asserted that 'capitalism is not the source of all evil' (1978a: 
24, 207) and reflected on the problems of the bureaucratic deformation of 
state socialism during its drive for industrialization. 
 
2. Poulantzas would nonetheless have insisted on analyzing the 
appropriation and transformation of nature as well as the natural limits to 
the expanded reproduction of capital in relational terms, i.e., in terms of a 
class analysis of environmental issues. He would have critiqued 
productivism (the celebration of production for the sake of production,  
tied to the creation of new use-values in order to realize surplus-value) as 
an effect of the treadmill of capital accumulation; and he would have 
linked this to uneven development, to the dynamic of inter-imperialist 
rivalries, and to the phenomena of imperialism. Moreover, while 
recognizing the increasingly general impact of some aspects of ecological 
pollution, depletion of renewable resources, and disruption of natural 
systems, he would also have noted that their impact was not uniform and 
that responses to these challenges were conditioned in part by divisions 
among the dominant classes, inter-imperialist competition and rivalries, 
dependency relations within the world market, and conflicts among the 
popular masses. In this sense, then, he would not have abandoned class 
analysis (unlike André Gorz bidding farewell to the working class) but 
would have agreed with Michel Löwy that  
'The ecological issue is …the great challenge for a renewal of Marxist 
thought at the threshold of the 21st century. It requires that Marxists 
undertake a deep critical revision of their traditional conception of 
"productive forces," and that they break radically with the ideology of 
linear progress and with the technological and economic paradigm of 
modern industrial civilization. … Ecologists are mistaken if they 
imagine they can do without the Marxian critique of capitalism (2005: 
15, 17)  
Nor would he have stopped with recognizing the continued importance of 
the historically specific form of capitalist relations of production, their role 
in the development of the forces of production, and their impact on the 
forms of wealth production and transformation of nature. He would have 
tied this, as noted, to the analysis class powers and, especially, to the role 
of capitalist states in mediating and guiding responses to ecological 
problems.  
 
3. Thus Poulantzas would have paid special attention to (a) conflicts within 
and across different national and transnational capitalist fractions and  
(b) the tensions inherent in the co-existence of a tendentially ever-more 
integrated world market with the globalization of ecological crisis-
tendencies and the continued existence of a plurality of national states. 
Indeed, as he emphasized, ‘neither within capital as a whole nor within 
monopoly capital itself, is there an instance capable of laying down who 
should make sacrifices so that others may continue to prosper’ (1978a: 
182-3). This results in contradictions that traverse the networks and 
branches of the state economic apparatus in their entirety (1978a: 171) 
and leads to decisions favourable to the economic interests of capital that 
may nonetheless prove incompatible with the maintenance of hegemony, 
the more so as all state policies and practices are being reorganized 
around economic imperatives (1978a: 167-169).  
 
4. It is in regard to the state that we would expect Poulantzas to make his 
most significant contribution to political ecology. Specifically, he would 
have analyzed the changing boundaries and changing scope of the 
economic and extra-economic spheres as the ecological crisis begins to 
impact accumulation strategies and modes of regulation and/or to move 
ecological issues from the margins life to the heart of contemporary 
politics. This in turn would be reflected in his analysis of the changing 
techno-economic-ecological functions of the state as well as their 
continuing subordination to its generic function of maintaining social 
cohesion in a class-divided society. It would also be reflected in his 
discussion of the growing trend towards authoritarian statism insofar as 
the requirements of ecological, strategic resource, economic, and, above 
all, bio-security are likely to reinforce the generic crisis tendencies of 
capitalism and to intensify political struggles within and among national 
states. These claims are grounded above all in the analysis of the state 
and the economy in State, Power, Socialism (1978a), which is extremely 
sensitive to the variability of the articulation between the economic and 
political spheres and the increasing politicization of the economy and 
economization of the political. Thus Poulantzas would have analyzed how 
disputes over environmental policy and issues of political ecological 
governance more generally are shot through with disputes within and 
among fractions of capital, intensifying cracks in the power bloc (1978a: 
212-213). The impact of ecological crisis would also have repercussions 
on other classes and social categories, leading to the politicization of 
ecological issues and their movement from 'secondary fronts' to a central 
place in the overall articulation of politics. More generally, once the state 
comes into being, it transforms all it touches (including, by implication, the 
‘state of nature’, which becomes politicized ‘nature of the state’) (1978a). 
 
5. Poulantzas would have integrated a Marxist critique of political ecology 
into his strategy for a democratic transition to democratic socialism. The 
social movements that he saw as key flanking and supporting forces in 
the socialist project included environmental groups, the anti-nuclear 
movement, feminism, and so on. Thus he acknowledges already in State, 
Power, Socialism that: 
the objective field of popular alliances is undergoing considerable 
expansion. In addition, conflicts more closely bound up with the 
ideological crisis appear as both the origin and the effect of a new 
popular awareness concerning questions that are now no longer 
“secondary” fronts – witness, in this regard, the student movement, 
the women’s liberation movement and the ecological movement’ 
(1978a: 211). 
Contemporary French environmentalists, with rare exceptions, tended to 
be localist and piecemeal in orientation, perhaps justifying Poulantzas's 
treatment of them as having secondary significance; the more recent 
growth of green movements and green parties to become an independent 
political force at national and, indeed, international level must change this 
calculation. But it would still involve linking the critique of political ecology 
with that of political economy, showing the organic connection between 
the capitalist form of wealth production as an immense accumulation of 
commodities and the specific dynamic and forms of the ecological crisis in 
individual capitalist social formations, the world market, and an 
increasingly global village. 
 
4. Democratic Socialism 
 
Poulantzas refused to present a general model for a transitional state. As he noted: 
A “model” of the State of transition to socialism cannot be drawn up: not as 
a universal model capable of being concretized in given cases, nor even as 
an infallible, theoretically guaranteed recipe for one or several countries 
(1978a: 22). 
Nonetheless, his overall strategic recommendations for a democratic transition to 
democratic socialism comprised a threefold combination of struggles within the 
state to modify the balance of forces, struggles to transform the state to make it 
more accessible to popular forces and to weaken the structurally-inscribed 
selectivities of the existing state apparatus, and struggles at a distance from the 
state to modify the internal balance of forces and polarize them towards a radical 
transformation. In addition, he offered specific recommendations about the 
appropriate form of state for democratic socialism – one based on a judicious 
combination of direct democracy and representative democracy in which the 
economic and political logic of each moderated the tendencies towards failure of  
the other. Indeed, Poulantzas emphasized the ‘irreducible tension’ between direct 
democracy and representative democracy (1978b: 177, italics in original; cf. 1978a). 
Thus, as he noted elsewhere, direct democracy runs the risk of factory [or 
enterprise] egoism and parochialism and could also fail because of limited 
resources and lack of support from the centre; similarly, both organized labour 
movements as well as social movements without ties to organized labour run in 
equal measure the risk of being absorbed into the networks of the state.4 
Conversely, a purely representative democracy runs the risk of deepening the 
separation of the representatives and represented and being insensitive to local 
needs. The dual solution that Poulantzas called for was (a) the democratization of 
the state and its representative organs so that it would be more open to pressures 
from below and at a distance from the state and also more ready to support them in 
their own struggles and (b) the development of what I choose to call maximum 
feasible solidarity among local-regional and single- or limited-issue movements so 
that the problems of parochialism, localism, and egoism can be limited within the 
pursuit of an overall vision of democratic socialism. 
  
These ideas can be expressed in systems-theoretical terms through the ideas of 
'requisite variety' and 'necessary reflexivity'. First, if no mode of economic and 
political organization provides an optimal means of economic and political 
governance, because of the inherent selectivities involved in each and because of 
their associated crisis-tendencies and typical forms of failure, then it makes sense 
to combine several modes that can be deployed with their weight varying according 
to the relative extent, intensity, and urgency of specific problems. Poulantzas's 
arguments for combining direct and representative democracy, especially if 
combined with a multi-scalar approach to democratic governance, appear to be 
consistent with this perspective. Second, if there is no fool-proof, inherently 
successful mode of representation and governance, then it is essential to promote 
foresight, reflexivity, and feedback on potential and emerging problems and their 
provisional solutions.  
 
But requisite variety and reflexivity are insufficient. For, if there are no guarantees of 
success and some measure of failure is inevitable, something more is required. 
Poulantzas was certainly well aware of the risks of revolutionary action, even when 
it proved successful in the first instance. For he had condemned the bureaucratic 
deformation of the Russian revolution; criticized the failure of the democratic 
transition in Portugal; and warned about the limits to social democracy. But this did 
not lead him to advocate an immediate move to armed struggle. He was a strong 
believer in conjunctural analysis and in identifying the horizons of possibility in 
advancing the cause of democratic socialism in particular times and places. Thus, in 
State, Power, Socialism, Poulantzas not only criticized the social democratic belief 
in a gradual, irreversible, and cumulative movement to democratic socialism but 
also cautioned strongly against regarding violent onslaught on the state as a 
genuine alternative to a democratic transition to democratic socialism. One way to 
think about this is in terms of the inherent limits to revolutionary mobilization and 
the risks of failure. If these risks are high, then it is better to engage in a double 
form of irony. The first form is familiar from the well known aphorism that Gramsci 
placed on the masthead of L'Ordine Nuovo: 'pessimism of the intellect, optimism  
of the will'. This translates in the present context into the need to recognize the risks 
of failure, but to act as if you can succeed. Yet, as Poulantzas noted, there is no 
'theoretically guaranteed recipe' for success. So the second form of irony is to 
reflect that, if one cannot guarantee success, one can at least choose one's mode  
of likely failure. And, if so, one must choose wisely. I believe that Poulantzas faced 
up to both dilemmas and quite consciously argued in State, Power, Socialism that it 
was better to choose the risk of a democratic failure to make a democratic transition 
to democratic socialism than to risk the consequences of opting for a bloody failure 
to make a violent transition to an unknown socialism. But in opting for the path of 
democratic failure, he also aimed to minimize the chances of democratic failure 
through his recommendations about the form that such a democratic path should 
take. For this should combine direct and representative democracy, class and cross-
class mobilization, political parties and social movements, in an unstable mix 




We live in an epoch and conjuncture that is radically different in many crucial 
respects from that in which Poulantzas lived, reflected, and struggled. His overall 
approach to critical political economy and, in particular, the state remains valid. But 
it cannot just be applied in the condition in which he left it. Alongside the work of 
mourning we must put the work of renewal. This involves continuing the unfinished 
work of a basic theoretical revolution in Marxist analyses of the state and 
disentangling arguments specific to particular conjunctures and national cases and 
those that have a more general validity for a historical period or for the logic of 
capital accumulation and state intervention as a whole. We should approach this 
task in the same critical spirit as Poulantzas himself tackled his own studies as 
well as those of others: to appreciate its significant theoretical ruptures, to fill its 
gaps, to assess its relevance to new problems and theoretical currents, to develop  
it in new directions. But we should also try to avoid that theoreticism that deforms 
and stultifies so much Marxist analysis and link theoretical analysis with issues of 
political strategy. Poulantzas himself fought long and hard for left unity in France 
and Greece and tried to provide the theoretical foundations for an effective strategy 
oriented to a democratic transition to democratic socialism under the conditions of 
contemporary capitalism. This was certainly a struggle worth fighting and it is even 
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1
 Poulantzas committed suicide in November 1979, so events thereafter are 
irrelevant to this story. 
2
 Deléage (1994: 47, cited by Whiteside, 2002: 190). cf. O’Connor on neglect of the 
so-called ‘second contradiction’ of capitalism. 
3
 This argument, which is grounded in Poulantzas’s own approach to similar 
questions, is also consistent with the French intellectual tradition, with its concern 
with ‘how nature and humanity are mutually defining’ (Whitehead 2002: 4; the 
French political ecologist, Moscovici 1974 on Marx’s recognition that man is part of 
nature). 
4
 See Poulantzas, 1978b: 176, in relation to Ingrao’s strategy for social movements; 
and ibid, pp 180 and 182 on the risks of corporatism. 
